

Spam and Ham



성균관대학교
최형기

Agenda

- ▷ Introduction to spam
- ▷ Techniques spammers use
- ▷ Kinds of spam
- ▷ Solutions to spam
- ▷ Conclusion




Electronic Mail

▷ Three major components:

- ▲ user agents
- ▲ mail servers
- ▲ simple mail transfer protocol: SMTP


▷ User Agent

- ▲ a.k.a. "mail reader"
- ▲ composing, editing, reading mail messages
- ▲ e.g., Eudora, Outlook, elm, Netscape Messenger
- ▲ outgoing, incoming messages stored on server




Electronic Mail: mail servers

- ▷ **mailbox** contains incoming messages (yet to be read) for user
- ▷ **message** queue of outgoing (to be sent) mail messages
- ▷ **SMTP protocol** between mail servers to send email messages
 - ▲ client: sending mail server
 - ▲ server: receiving mail server



How Are E-mails Transported?




- ▷ MUA= Mail User Agent, *aka* Mail Client
- ▷ MTA=Mail Transport Agent, *aka* Mail Server

Composition and Delivery

- ▷ Sender supplies **To:** and **Subject:** fields and message body.
- ▷ MUA translates into RFC 822 message and connects across LAN to MTA
- ▷ MUA instructs MTA using a protocol called SMTP (or a proprietary alternative; e.g. MS exchange) and sends RFC 822 message.
- ▷ Sender's MTA uses MX record in DNS to find IP address of recipient's MTA based on **To:** field.
- ▷ Sender's MTA opens connection to Recipient's MTA transfer RFC 822 message using SMTP.
- ▷ Recipient's MTA may deliver to Recipient's MUA or may store message locally for later retrieval.

Mail access protocols



- ▷ SMTP: delivery/storage to receiver's server
- ▷ Mail access protocol: retrieval from server
 - ▲ POP: Post Office Protocol [RFC 1939]
 - ▼ authorization (agent <--> server) and download
 - ▲ IMAP: Internet Mail Access Protocol [RFC 1730]
 - ▼ more features (more complex)
 - ▼ manipulation of stored msgs on server
 - ▲ HTTP: Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, etc.

Electronic Mail: SMTP [RFC 821]

- ▷ Uses TCP to reliably transfer email msg from client to server, port 25
- ▷ Direct transfer: sending server to receiving server
- ▷ Three phases of transfer
 - ▲ handshaking (greeting)
 - ▲ transfer of messages
 - ▲ closure
- ▷ Command/response interaction
 - ▲ **commands**: ASCII text
 - ▲ **response**: status code and phrase
- ▷ Messages must be in 7-bit ASCII

Mail message format

▷ RFC 822: standard for text message format:

▷ header lines, e.g.,

▲ To:


▲ From:

▲ Subject:

different from SMTP commands!

▷ body

▲ the “message”, ASCII characters only



Sample SMTP interaction

```
S: 220 hamburger.edu
C: HELO crepes.fr
S: 250 Hello crepes.fr, pleased to meet you
C: MAIL FROM: <alice@crepes.fr>
S: 250 alice@crepes.fr... Sender ok
C: RCPT TO: <bob@hamburger.edu>
S: 250 bob@hamburger.edu ... Recipient ok
C: DATA
S: 354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
C: Do you like ketchup?
C:   How about pickles?
C: .
S: 250 Message accepted for delivery
C: QUIT
S: 221 hamburger.edu closing connection
```

SMTP: final words

- ▷ SMTP uses persistent connections
- ▷ SMTP requires message (header & body) to be in 7-bit ASCII
- ▷ certain character strings not permitted in msg (e.g., **CRLF.CRLF**). Thus msg has to be encoded (usually into either base-64 or quoted printable)
- ▷ SMTP server uses **CRLF.CRLF** to determine end of message

Multimedia Extensions

- ▷ MIME: multimedia mail extension, RFC 2045, 2056
- ▷ additional lines in msg header declare MIME content type

MIME version
method used
to encode data
multimedia data
type, subtype,
parameter declaration
encoded data

```
From: alice@crepes.fr
To: bob@hamburger.edu
Subject: Picture of yummy crepe.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: image/jpeg

base64 encoded data .....
.....base64 encoded data
```

Multipart Type

From: alice@crepes.fr
To: bob@hamburger.edu
Subject: Picture of yummy crepe.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=98766789

--98766789

Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain

Dear Bob,
Please find a picture of a crepe.

--98766789

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Type: image/jpeg

base64 encoded data

.....

.....base64 encoded data

--98766789--

MIME headers

- ▷ MIME specifies 5 new e-mail header fields:
 - ▲ **MIME-Version** (must be 1.0)
 - ▲ **Content-Type**
 - ▲ **Content-Transfer-Encoding**
 - ▲ **Content-ID** - optional
 - ▲ **Content-Description** - optional

MIME Content-Type

- ▷ Seven major content types with 15 sub-types.
- ▷ **Multipart** content type has 4 subtypes.
- ▷ Most important is **Multipart/mixed**, indicating that the body contains multiple parts.
- ▷ Each part can be a separate MIME message – hence nesting of MIME messages to any level.
- ▷ Parts separated by a boundary string defined in **Content-Type** field.

Content-Transfer-Encoding

- ▷ RFC 822 e-mails can contain only ASCII characters.
- ▷ MIME messages intended to transport arbitrary data.
- ▷ The **Content-Transfer-Encoding** field indicates how data was encoded from raw data to ASCII.
- ▷ **base64** is a common encoding:
 - ▲ 24 data bits (3 bytes) at a time encoded to 4 ASCII characters.

What is Spam?

- ▷ Typical legal definition: unsolicited commercial email from someone without a pre-existing business relationship.

Kinds of Spam

- ▷ Email spam (you already know about that)
- ▷ Newsgroup spam
- ▷ Chat rooms
- ▷ Popups
 - ▲ Web pages
 - ▲ Spyware
- ▷ Search engine spam
- ▷ Conclusion:
If you can advertise for free, someone will

Newsgroup Spam

- ▷ Just like email spam
- ▷ Cheaper for spammers – post once download many times
- ▷ Not big issue because ... no one uses newsgroups
 - ▲ That's because they are all full of spam
 - ▲ Could the same thing happen to email?!

Chat Room Spam

- ▷ Spambots come in and pretend to chat
 - ▲ But really just advertising porn sites
 - ▲ Some spambots trivial
 - ▼ Don't talk at all, but take up space
 - ▼ Link to porn spam in their profile
 - ▲ Some spambots very sophisticated
 - ▼ You can have a short conversation with them before they try to convince you to go to their website

Popup Spam

- ▷ Web page popups
 - ▲ You go to a web page, and get a popup
 - ▲ May be a “pop under” that appears under all other windows, so you don’t even know where it came from
- ▷ Spyware (e.g. Gator)
 - ▲ Software installed on your computer either without your permission, or where permission is hidden deep in license agreement.
 - ▲ Creates popups all the time

Search Engine Spam

▷ Link spam

- ▲ Search engines use number of links to determine rankings
- ▲ Spammers create millions of pages that link to their site
- ▲ Fake pages may be realistic and may be returned as search results, too.

▷ Word spam

- ▲ Spammers put misleading words on their page, e.g. celebrity names or technical terms
- ▲ Page is actual porn

▷ Blog spam

- ▲ Some web pages let anyone post comments
- ▲ Spammers automate comment posting, add links to their pages

Hence ...

- ▷ Anywhere you can place free advertising, someone will
- ▷ Even after we solve email spam, there will be lots more to work on
- ▷ Some techniques from email spam transfer, some don't

Techniques that Spammers Use

- ▷ Obscuring mail to avoid filters
 - ▲ Content in Images, Good word Chaff, Content Chaff, URL Spamming, Hidden Text, Character Encoding, etc...
- ▷ Getting email addresses
 - ▲ Dictionary attacks
 - ▲ Web Crawling
- ▷ Sending spam
 - ▲ Open proxies
 - ▲ Open relays
 - ▲ Zombies

Obscuring mail

▷ Modify spam to avoid filters

- ▲ Content in Images
- ▲ Good word Chaff
- ▲ Content Chaff
- ▲ URL Spamming
- ▲ Hidden Text
- ▲ Character Encoding
- ▲ Etc...

Weather Report Guy

- ▷ Content in Image
- ▷ Good Word Chaff

Weather, Sunny, High 82, Low 81, Favorite...

**100's of Lenders
Compete for your
Loan to get you
the *Lowest Rate!***

- Refinancing
- New Home Loans
- Debt Consolidation
- Debt Consultation
- Auto Loans
- Credit Cards
- Student Loans
- Second Mortgage
- Home Equity

***Good Credit - Bad Credit
Bankruptcy - Foreclosure***



Interest Rates are at their lowest point in 40 years! We help you find the best rate for your situation by matching your needs with hundreds of lenders!

100% Free Service!

[Click Here To Begin](#)

hmmzy/l info
mrojto ya kaga.

Weather

NA, NA - Sunny

High: 82 , Low: 81 degrees

[Favorites](#)



Diploma Guy

▷ Word Obscuring

Dplmoia Pragorm

Caerte a mroe prosoeprus

Dlpmoia Pragorm

Caerte a mroe prosoeprus fitue for yorsuelf

Recieve a flul doplima from non arecedited
unvtersiies baesd upon your rael lfe exneriepcce

You will not be tseted, or irteeviewnd
Receive a Msetar's, Bachelor's or Dtctarooo

Clal 24 horus a day 7 days a week

1 - 2 7 0 - 8 1 7 - 8 2 4 7



Trends in Spam Exploits

▷ Based on 1,200 spam messages sent to Hotmail

Exploit	2003 Spam	2004 Spam	Delta (Absolute %)	Description
Word Obscuring	4%	20%	16%	Misspelling words, putting words into images, etc.
URL Spamming	0%	10%	10%	Adding URLs to non-spam sites (e.g. msn.com).
Domain Spoofing	41%	50%	9%	Using an invalid or fake domain in the from line.
Token Breaking	7%	15%	8%	Breaking words with punctuation, space, etc.
MIME Attacks	5%	11%	6%	Putting non-spam content in one body part and spam content in another.
Text Chaff	52%	56%	4%	Random strings of characters, random series or words, or unrelated sentences.
URL Obscuring	22%	17%	-5%	Encoding a URL in hexadecimal, hiding the true URL with an @ sign, etc.
Character Encoding	5%	0%	-5%	Phar#109;acy renders into Pharmacy.

Getting Email Addresses

▷ Dictionary Attacks:

- ▲ Try millions or billions of possible email addresses
 - ▼ Put together first-name and last-name, or first-name + number, etc.
 - ▼ See if the mail “bounces”: if not, you have a live address
 - ▼ Use “**Web beacons**” to check if mail is being read

▷ Web crawling:

- ▲ Look for email addresses on web pages

▷ Send spam to these addresses or sell them to other spammers

Sending Spam -- Open Relays

- ▷ In the old days, before the fully connected internet, it was “nice” to forward mail meant for someone else.
- ▷ A mail server is an “open relay” if it will forward on behalf of anyone.
- ▷ Spammers love open relays
 - ▲ A little harder to trace them
 - ▲ Shifts bandwidth and other burdens to someone else
- ▷ But open relays are added to **blackhole** lists, and quickly cannot send legitimate mail

Sending Spam -- Open Proxies

- ▷ These are web-page proxy servers
 - ▲ Used for getting web-pages past firewalls
 - ▲ Should have nothing to do with email
- ▷ Spammers exploit holes
 - ▲ Exploit a hole that you can use some proxies to send email
 - ▲ Exploit another hole that anyone can access the proxy-server
- ▷ Spammers really love these
 - ▲ Almost impossible to trace spammer
 - ▲ Less incentive for owner to close the proxy than to close open mail relays: they don't care if their web proxy is on an email blackhole list

Sending Spam -- Zombies

- ▷ Consumer computers taken over by viruses or trojans
 - ▲ Spammer tells them what to send
 - ▲ Very difficult to trace
 - ▲ Very cheap for spammer
 - ▲ Rent a zombie for about \$3/month!
- ▷ As much as 40-60% of spam may originate from zombies now!

Solutions to Spam

- ▷ Filtering
 - ▲ Matching/Fuzzy Hashing
 - ▲ Blackhole Lists (IP addresses)
- ▷ Postage
 - ▲ Turing Tests, Money, Computation
- ▷ Safe sender lists (Bonded Sender)
- ▷ Disposable Email Addresses
- ▷ Habeas Haiku
- ▷ Email authentication

Filtering -- Machine Learning

- ▷ Learn spam versus good (ham)
- ▷ Problem: need source of training data
 - ▲ Get users to volunteer GOOD and SPAM
- ▷ But spammers are adapting to machine learning too
 - ▲ Images, different words, misspellings, etc.
- ▷ We use machine learning – details later

Matching / Fuzzy Hashing

- ▷ Automatically get examples of known spam
 - ▲ Use “Honeypots” Use “Report Junk” button data
- ▷ Look for similar messages that arrive in real mailboxes
 - ▲ Exact match easily defeated
 - ▲ Use fuzzy hashes
 - ▼ How effective?
- ▷ The Chinese menu (madlibs) attack will defeat any exact match filters or fuzzy hashing

Make thousands of dollars working at home !!!
Earn lots of money in the comfort of your own house •

Rule-based Filtering

- ▷ Keyword-based filtering
 - ▲ If **SUBJECT** contains
“FREE”, “TEENS”, “Hello!!!”
- ▷ How about “!!!!!!!hello!!!!hello!!!hello”?
- ▷ Miss-spelling: Porn → P0rn
- ▷ Strength
 - ▲ Easy to implement
 - ▲ Linear computational cost to # of rules
- ▷ Weakness
 - ▲ Low precision
 - ▲ Adding thousands of rules is a tedious work

Challenge-Response Filtering

- ▷ Email from someone NOT on your whitelist, an automatic reply is sent telling what steps the sender should take to be considered for the whitelist
 - ▲ (e.g. send you a confirmation, make a donation, solve a puzzle, etc.)
- ▷ Very effective at stopping spam BUT has a number of drawbacks:
 - ▲ valid mail delayed
 - ▲ kind of harsh -- some may think of it as inconsiderate and never reply, extra work for senders etc.

Content-based Filtering

- ▷ What is the signature in spam?
- ▷ People can find that 'join today', 'FREE' are good indicators for spam! But this doesn't mean mail containing these words are definitely spam, but a high PROBABILITY they are!

Naïve Bayes

- ▷ Basically, want $P(\text{spam} | \text{words})$
- ▷ Use Bayes Rule:

$$P(\text{spam} | \text{words}) = \frac{P(\text{words} | \text{spam}) \times P(\text{spam})}{P(\text{words})}$$

$$P(\text{words}) = P(\text{words} | \text{spam}) \times P(\text{spam}) + P(\text{words} | \text{good}) \times P(\text{good})$$

- ▷ Assume independence: probability of each word independent of others (wrong assumption)


$$P(\text{words} | \text{spam}) \approx P(\text{word1} | \text{spam}) \times P(\text{word2} | \text{spam}) \times \dots \times P(\text{wordn} | \text{spam})$$

Blackhole Lists

- ▷ Lists of IP addresses that send spam
 - ▲ Open relays, Open proxies, DSL/Cable lines, etc...
- ▷ Easy to make mistakes
 - ▲ Open relays, DSL, Cable send good and spam...
- ▷ Who makes the lists?
 - ▲ Some list-makers very aggressive
 - ▲ Some list-makers too slow

Postage

- ▷ Basic problem with email is that it is free
 - ▲ Force everyone to pay (especially spammers) and spam goes away
 - ▲ Send payment pre-emptively, with each outbound message, or wait for challenge
- ▷ Multiple kinds of payment: Turing Test, Computation, Money



Turing Tests (Naor '96)

▷ You send me mail; I don't know you

▷ I send you a challenge:
type these letters



FXLT6 HEB

▷ Your response is sent to my computer

▷ Your message is moved to my inbox if correct.

Money

- ▷ Pay actual money (1 cent?) to send a message
- ▷ My favorite variation: take money only when user hits “Report Spam” button
 - ▲ Otherwise, refund to sender
 - ▲ Free for non-spammers to send mail, but expensive for spammers
- ▷ Requires multiple monetary transactions for every message sent – expensive
- ▷ Who pays for infrastructure?

Safe Sender Lists

- ▷ Block lists are hard
 - ▲ People get very angry when you call them a spammer
 - ▲ There are 2^{32} IP addresses
 - ▲ Hard to know when to stop blocking
- ▷ Instead, make lists of known good senders
 - ▲ Amazon pays someone, e.g. Bonded Sender, to be added to list of known good senders
 - ▲ Users download or check Bonded Sender list
 - ▲ No one can get angry
 - ▲ Relatively small number
 - ▲ Sender can be given incentives to tell you when he changes IP addresses or use non-IP based methods

Bonded Sender

- ▷ Program developed by IronPort systems, now working with TrustE
- ▷ List safe IP addresses
- ▷ Senders must “post a bond” – deposit money with Bonded Sender
- ▷ Portion of bond is confiscated based on complaints
 - ▲ However, some users make mistakes, so you get some complaints “for free.”
- ▷ Need to monitor volume rate (to compute complaint rate) and so that a spammer cannot post a small bond and then send billions of messages quickly
 - ▲ Record number of queries about each sender

Habeas' Haiku

▷ Sender warranted email™

The Habeas Warrant Mark

X-Habeas-SWE-1: winter into spring

X-Habeas-SWE-2: brightly anticipated

X-Habeas-SWE-3: like Habeas SWE (tm)

X-Habeas-SWE-4: Copyright 2002 Habeas (tm)

X-Habeas-SWE-5: Sender Warranted Email (SWE) (tm). The sender of this

X-Habeas-SWE-6: email in exchange for a license for this Habeas

X-Habeas-SWE-7: warrant mark warrants that this is a Habeas Compliant

X-Habeas-SWE-8: Message (HCM) and not spam. Please report use of this

X-Habeas-SWE-9: mark in spam to <<http://www.habeas.com/report/>>.

▷ Vigilant to prevent spammers from misusing The Habeas Warrant Mark.

▷ Once a breach discovered, unlicensed IP addresses will be placed on Habeas blacklist.

Disposable Email Addresses

- ▷ Also called Ephemeral Addresses
- ▷ You have one address for each sender
 - ▲ **JOSHUAG01895422@microsoft.com**
 - ▲ All go to same mailbox
- ▷ If I give you my address, and you send me spam, I just delete the address
- ▷ How do new senders get an address?
- ▷ If I send mail to 3 people, which address is it From?
- ▷ Hard to remember!

Miscellaneous

- ▷ Email masking
 - ▲ Hide email address from automatic email bot
- ▷ Limit issuing of email account
 - ▲ Must involved HIP (Human Interactive Proof)
- ▷ Outbound control
 - ▲ Set max. send of mail per day
 - ▲ Limit interval between sending mails
- ▷ Mail server vulnerability check
 - ▲ Look for open relay, open proxy and zombie

Email Authentication

- ▷ Traditional Email authentication
 - ▲ SMTP Auth and STARTTLS
 - ▲ Designed to restrict who can connect to a mail server
 - ▲ Closed system
- ▷ Traditional Email signing
 - ▲ S/MIME and PGP
 - ▲ Designed to cryptographically prove the individual author and content of a message
 - ▲ Secure but heavy
 - ▲ Requires enabled clients

Domain Authentication


- ▷ Emerging standards designed to authenticate domains from which an email was sent
 - ▲ e.g. SenderID, DomainKeys
- ▷ Lighter weight than traditional email signing mechanism
 - ▲ Not required enabled clients
 - ▲ Only sending and receiving MTAs need to be aware
- ▷ Not break backward compatibility
- ▷ Not require a “flag day”

DomainKeys by Yahoo

- ▷ Email spoofing
 - ▲ Forge another person's email to get users to trust
 - ▲ Without sender authentication, difficult to know for certain if message is legitimate or forged
- ▷ DomainKeys provides mechanism for verifying domain of email and message integrity
- ▷ Once domain can be verified, compare against domain in **From:** field in the header
- ▷ MTA such as gmail start to implement
- ▷ gmail started to implement DomainKeys
- ▷ Similar to Cisco's IIM (Identified Internet Email)


DomainKeys – Sending servers

- ▷ Domain owner setup a public/private key pair.
 - ▲ This public key published in DNS (step A)
- ▷ Authorized end-users in domain send email email system generates digital signature using domain's private key
 - ▲ Signature is prepend to the email header as shown in step B




DomainKeys – Receiving servers

- ▷ Extract signature and claimed **From:** field in the header and fetch public key from DNS
 - ▲ step C
- ▷ Verify signature
- ▷ This proves that
 - ▲ email was truly sent by claimed From: field
 - ▲ Not altered during transfer
- ▷ Deliver
 - ▲ Step D



SPF and senderID

1. Sender sends an e-mail message to Receiver.
2. Receiver's inbound mail server receives mail.



3. Receiver's server checks for SPF (Sender Policy Framework) record of the sending domain published in DNS.
 - ▷ Sending domain founded in **From:** field in the header
4. Inbound e-mail server determines if sending e-mail server's IP address matches the IP address that is published in DNS.

Sender Authentication

- ▷ A way of “closing” your inbox to people you don’t know
 - ▲ Similar to Instant Messaging
- ▷ Probably longer-term due to MUA changes, but paradigm shifts

Email Authentication Summary

- ▷ Allows a Sender to prove they're who they claim to be
- ▷ Prevents Spammers/Phishers from pretending to be someone else
 - ▲ Anyone could have claimed to be **security@ebay.com**
- ▷ Enables more meaningful **Accreditation / Reputation**

Conclusion

- ▷ Lots of different solutions
- ▷ Often, they work best in combination
 - ▲ Example: combine machine learning filters with postage or use machine learning filters and HIPs to help stop outbound spam
 - ▲ No single discipline can solve this
- ▷ Final solution will combine approaches
 - ▲ Safe sender lists and postage help ensure all good mail gets through
 - ▲ Filters, blackhole lists stop mail from unknown or known bad senders