

Measurement of Campus Network with Network Telescope

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 - Network telescope
- CNU case study
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Introduction

❑ Internet measurement

- Basic monitoring, capacity planning, accounting, security

❑ What to monitor ?

➤ Active

- loss, delay, jitter, bandwidth (IPPM)
 - End-to-end path, access/core links, node

➤ Passive

- Packet, netflow (IPFIX)
 - Link, router/switch

Passive Monitoring

□ Link monitor

- CAIDA coralreef
- DAG project at U. of Waikato, New Zealand
 - Endace measurement systems
 - ATM, POS, GE, 10-GE
- Wise Trafview project at ETRI
- Sprint IPMON

□ Router monitor

- NetFlow v5/v9 : IETF IPFIX WG
 - Flow collectors
 - Flow-tools
 - Flow probe
 - fprobe, nprobe
 - Flow analyzer
 - Flow-scan
 - Arbor networks

Network Telescope

□ CAIDA

□ What is a network telescope ?


- a portion of routed IP address space in which little or no legitimate traffic exists.
- A way of seeing remote security events, without being there

□ Can see


- various forms of flooding denial-of-service attacks
- infection of hosts by Internet worms
- network scanning
- misconfiguration



IPv4 Address Utilization



Basic Idea




If a computer sends packets to IP addresses *randomly*, we should see some of the packets if we monitor enough address space.

Network Telescope

- ❑ Chunk of (globally) routed IP address space
- ❑ Little or no legitimate traffic (or easily filtered)
 - might be "holes" in a real production network
- ❑ Unexpected traffic arriving at the network
 - telescope can imply remote network/security events
- ❑ Generally good for seeing explosions, not small events
 - Depends on statistics/randomness working

Network Telescope: Denial-of-Service Attacks

- ❑ Attacker floods the victim with requests using random spoofed source IP addresses
- ❑ Victim believes requests are legitimate and responds to each spoofed address
- ❑ With a /8 ("class A"), one can observe 1/256th of all *victim responses* to spoofed



Backscatter

Analysis Technique

- ❑ Flooding-style DoS attacks
 - e.g. SYN flood, ICMP flood
- ❑ Attackers spoof source address randomly
 - True of many major attack tools
 - i.e. not SMURF or reflector attack
- ❑ Victims, in turn, respond to attack packets
- ❑ Unsolicited responses (backscatter) equally distributed across IP space
- ❑ Received backscatter is evidence of an attacker elsewhere

Backscatter Analysis

- Monitor block of n IP addresses
- Expected number of backscatter packets given an attack of m packets

$$E[X] = \frac{nm}{2^{32}}$$

- Extrapolated attack rate R is a function of measured backscatter rate R' :

$$R \geq R' \frac{2^{32}}{n}$$

Assumption and Biases

□ *Address uniformity*

- Ingress filtering, reflectors, etc. cause us to **underestimate** number of attacks
- Can bias rate estimation (can we test uniformity?)

□ *Reliable delivery*

- Packet losses, server overload & rate limiting cause us to **underestimate** attack rates/durations

□ *Backscatter hypothesis*


- Can be biased by purposeful unsolicited packets
 - Port scanning (minor factor at worst in practice)
- Can we verify backscatter at multiple sites?

What is a Network Worm?

- ❑ Self-propagating self-replicating network program
 - Exploits some vulnerability to infect remote machines
 - No human intervention necessary
 - Infected machines continue propagating infection



Network Telescope: Worm Attacks

- ❑ Infected host scans for other vulnerable hosts by randomly generating IP addresses
- ❑ /8 monitor 1/256th of all IPv4 addresses
- ❑ /8 see 1/256th of all worm traffic of worms (when no bias or bugs)




Code-Red Worm

- ❑ Exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft IIS
- ❑ July 2001
- ❑ 359,000 hosts infected in 24 hour period
 - 2,000 hosts infected per minute




Sapphire/Slammer Worm

- ❑ Exploited bug in MSSQL 2000 and MSDE 2000
- ❑ Worm fit in a single UDP packet (404 bytes)
- ❑ Sapphire
 - > 1 min : > 20,000 scans/sec
 - Peaks at 3 min: 55 million IP scans/sec
 - 90% of Internet scanned in < 10 mins
 - ~ 100,000 hosts infected in ten minutes



Before 9:30PM (PST)



After 9:40PM (PST)

What can we do ?

□ **Measurement**

- What are worms doing?
- What types of hosts are infected?
- Are new defense mechanisms working?

□ **Develop operational defense**

- Can we build an automated system to stop worms?


How to use Network Telescope ?

- ❑ Small telescopes may not be useful for observing external events
- ❑ Organizational network telescope
 - Useful for identifying internal problems
 - Capture data for hosts connecting to unallocated IP address space by
 - Find unallocated IP address space
 - BGP routing table
 - Flow collection on your edge router/link
 - Announce a couple unallocated networks

CNU Telescope


- /16 prefix
 - 255 /24 prefix blocks
 - Usually 134 /24 prefixes are not used
 - ~/17 prefix

- Let's see all incoming packets to 134 /24 prefix blocks



4Gbps Trunk	1Gbps	155Mbps	T3	Router	8606	Bay420	Cisco 7204
2Gbps Trunk	E1	100Mbps	10Gbps	8610CO	Bay380	Cisco 7513	

Measurement Point



Measurement System

- ❑ OS: Linux 2.4.18-14
- ❑ 1GE Nic: Intel Express Pro 1000 MF
 - Two nics for inbound/outbound traffic
- ❑ Measurement S/W
 - Pcaplib
 - Tcpdump/nProbe
 - Flow-tools
 - Flow-scan


- ❑ CNU traffic
 - <http://168.188.2.119/measurement>

From Captured Flows to Graph

1. Capture a packet
 - Software-based: pcaplib (e.g., tcpdump)
2. Generate netflow v5 flow
 - Tool: nProbe with pcaplib
 - Send netflow v5 in UDP datagram
3. Store flows into a file
 - Tool: flow-tools (flow-capture)
4. Analysis
 - update DB and plot graphs every 5 minutes
 - Graph of RRD DB with processed 5-minute aggregated file
 - Tools: flowscan, rrd
 - Offline
 - Tools: flow-tools, gnuplot, ppmtogif, gifsicle

CNU 트래픽


Chungnam University Campus Well Known Protocols/Services, Bits, +out/-in



Router: a11

Protocol	Out	In
GNUTELLA	0.0%	0.0%
DC	0.0%	0.0%
DNS	0.5%	0.0%
HTTPS	0.2%	2.4%
SMTP	0.2%	0.1%
NNTP	0.0%	0.3%
SSH	0.3%	0.1%
AIM	0.0%	0.0%
IMAP	0.0%	0.0%
KAZAA	0.0%	0.0%
FTP	4.8%	1.5%
BO2K	0.0%	0.0%
IRC	0.5%	0.1%
HTTP	21.8%	30.9%
POP3	0.0%	0.0%
TELNET	1.4%	1.2%
REAL	0.1%	2.5%
EDONKEY	0.0%	0.0%
Other services	70.2%	60.7%
TOTAL		


Chungnam University Campus Well Known Protocols/Services, Packets, +out/-in



Router: a11

Protocol	Out	In
GNUTELLA	0.0%	0.0%
DC	0.0%	0.0%
DNS	2.8%	0.3%
HTTPS	1.0%	1.4%
SMTP	0.5%	0.4%
NNTP	0.1%	0.2%
SSH	0.5%	0.2%
AIM	0.0%	0.0%
IMAP	0.0%	0.0%
KAZAA	0.0%	0.0%
FTP	2.9%	2.3%
BO2K	0.0%	0.0%
IRC	0.4%	0.3%
HTTP	25.0%	27.8%
POP3	0.0%	0.0%
TELNET	3.1%	2.4%
REAL	0.8%	1.5%
EDONKEY	0.0%	0.0%
Other Services	62.8%	63.0%
TOTAL		

Chungnam University Campus Well Known Protocols/Services, Flows, +out/-in




Router: a11

Protocol	Out	In
GNUTELLA	0.0%	0.0%
DC	0.0%	0.0%
DNS	2.8%	4.3%
HTTPS	0.1%	0.2%
SMTP	1.7%	1.7%
NNTP	0.0%	0.0%
SSH	4.8%	0.7%
AIM	0.0%	0.0%
IMAP	0.0%	0.0%
KAZAA	0.0%	0.0%
FTP	0.3%	0.5%
BO2K	0.0%	0.0%
IRC	0.2%	0.2%
HTTP	46.6%	56.3%
POP3	0.0%	0.1%
TELNET	0.3%	2.7%
REAL	0.2%	0.3%
EDONKEY	0.0%	0.0%
Other Services	42.3%	32.3%
TOTAL		


CNU Telescope: Unused Prefix

Sun Oct 17 18:44:00 2004

CNU Traffic: Packet per sec. vs. Subnet



Traffic captured by CNU Telescope




Flows of (src IP, dst IP, dst port) : 1 day traffic every 5 minutes

Traffic Statistics by CNU Telescope


- Period
 - 2004.8.23 - 2004.9.12 (3 weeks)
- NetFlow v5 flow data
 - Packet traces collected by tcpdump

CNU Normal Traffic




	Flows	Bytes	Packets
Inbound	21,936,820	852,079,335,590	1,054,645,523
Outbound	20,978,303	749,515,362,245	1,014,432,313


Utilization of /24 Prefix Blocks



/17 Prefix Telescope




Anomaly Traffic




	Flows	Bytes	Packets
Total	1,148,913	105,728,303	1,924,957
TCP	1,097,147	90,716,670	1,843,960
UDP	21,675	10,806,172	23,684
ICMP	30,088	4,205,142	57,310


Anomaly Traffic : Port Breakdown (1)




Anomaly Traffic : Port Breakdown (2)




of Scanned IP Addresses (TCP)




of Scanned IP Addresses (UDP)




of Scanned IP Addresses (ICMP)




of Senders (TCP)



of Senders (UDP)




of Senders (ICMP)




Port 22,23

To Dst Port 22


Number of Scanned Dst Addresses



Number of Scanned Dst Addresses




Src Addr toward port 23




Port 1023

To Dst Port 1023

Number of Scanned Dst Addresses




Src Addr toward port 1023




Port 1433

To Dst Port 1433

Number of Scanned Dst Addresses




Src Addr toward port 1433




Port 5554

To Dst Port 5554

Number of Scanned Dst Addresses




Src Addr toward port 5554




Port 9898

To Dst Port 5554

Number of Scanned Dst Addresses




Src Addr toward port 9898



ICMP

To Dst Port 0

Number of Scanned Dst Addresses



Summary

- Network telescope
 - Useful for monitoring anomaly traffic

- CNU network telescope
 - ~/17 prefix
 - Network scanning traffic

- Issues
 - Large telescope
 - Distributed monitoring multiple telescopes
 - Sharing traffic data with large storage server

Reference

- ❑ D. Moore, C. Shannon, G. M. Voelker, and S. Savage, "Network Telescopes," CAIDA technical report, 2004.
- ❑ nProbe, <http://www.ntop.org/nProbe.html>
- ❑ Caida, <http://www.caida.org>
- ❑ H. Kim, I. Kang, and S. Bahk, "Real-time Visualization of Network Attacks on High-Speed Link," IEEE Network Magazine, vol. 18 no. 5, pp. 30-39, Sep./Nov. 2004.